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556 generations.[3] These conditions accounted for the lack of a permanent ruling caste in China. There are definite ideals in traditional Chinese culture which conditioned the upward and downward mobility of the people within the social hierarchy.

B. Social Mobility

596 428 618 The family ideal. Large families, especially of the extended type, were the ideal in China.[4] However, in practice the ideal was limited by economic means. Primogeniture in China had been done away with long before the Manchu Dynasty (1644-1912). Land was divided equally among sons. After successive divisions, individual holdings became infinitesimally small. This contributed to the decline of the economic status of even the wealthiest families, particularly when land was the sole source of income.[5] On the other

3. Martin Yang, A Chinese Village, New York, 1945, p. 132; Francis Hsu, Under the Ancestors' Shadow, New York, Columbia University Press, 1948, p. 4.

4. Consult the chapter on The Family in this handbook.

5. "In the matter of inheritance, the general pattern observed for poor agriculturalists holds very well for the merchant group. Just as at the death of a farmer, there is a sharing of the property. In the agricultural situation, however, there seems to be greater fragmentation of the legacy, each son working his share more or less independently and with a minimum of combination.
(continued next page)

hand, because of the existence of extended families and the clan structure, less fortunate members of these groups might be helped by relatives to gain a living or an education. A substantial amount of land was usually allotted to the communal family or clan for religious, educational, or charity purposes by illustrious members of the family or clan. Nepotism was simply a projection of the family ideal of mutual help among the members. Clan nepotism often accounted for a man's rise on the social and economic ladder. This practice contributed to the upward movement of poorer segments of the population who otherwise might never have advanced socially and economically in a relatively short period of time.

The scholar ideal. Learning was much esteemed, especially when combined with wealth. The prestige of the wealthy was never complete until their wealth was adorned with culture. Indication of respect for learning was common in China, as typified by the saying: "Although your children may be of low intelligence, you as parents should make them

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5. (continued) In the merchant situation there is somewhat more cohesion among the heirs, who often work the inherited enterprise as partners." Fried, op. cit., p. 52.

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Annex "A," Subparagraph 1g,
Sociological Background

THE FAMILY

I. INTRODUCTION

• 596 Until almost the end of the imperial period (221 B.C. to A.D. 1912), the family was a vital and universal aspect of the centralized state in China and most characteristic of the society which sustained it. Since then, the family has been in flux. The direction of change and the major causes and problems involved will be sketched out in this section. A more precise picture, as Marion Levy has pointed out, is not feasible with the existing incomplete state of material on Chinese society both before and since the inauguration of the Communist regime.[1]

The traditional family still persists. It proved resistant, but not impregnable, to the influx of modern Western techniques and ideas after 1842 and to the political revolutionary efforts to realize democracy and equality in the present century. The traditional family is still proving tenacious, in the face of the Communist regime's persistent effort to turn Chinese society inside out.

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1. Marion J. Levy, Jr., The Family Revolution in Modern China, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1949, p. 273.

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To understand the nature of the Chinese family today, it is necessary first to take account of the structure, function, and attitudes of the traditional family. Second, consideration must be given to the incidence and nature of change in the family preceding the Communist regime. Only then can intelligent consideration be given to the family under the Central People's Government. Finally, attention will be devoted to the unique factors that characterize the family in East China.

II. THE TRADITIONAL FAMILY

The term "family" in China has been most usefully defined as "a unit consisting of members related to each other by blood, marriage, or adoption and having a common budget and common property."[2] Three main types of family structure have been distinguished -- the conjugal, the stem, and the joint forms. The joint family, consisting of several married brothers, their wives, children, and sometimes one or both parents, was the ideal family of China. It was typical only of the gentry and well-to-do merchant classes. The conjugal family, consisting of a man, his wife, and unmarried children, and the stem family, consisting of the conjugal family plus one married son with his wife and children,

2. Olga Lang, Chinese Family and Society, New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1946, p. 13. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

591 were most typical of the peasant, artisan, and small-merchant classes. For all classes, however, the joint family was the ideal to be achieved if an improvement in family circumstances permitted.[3]

The status of every member of the family was fixed relative to every other member by the criteria of age, sex, and generation. At the top of the family pyramid stood the head of the house, the oldest living male. In practice, he might consult with other adult members of the family on matters vital to its welfare; theoretically, and often in fact, he exercised complete control over the activities, income, property, training, punishment, and marriage arrangements of the family and its members.[4]

However old his sons, their position in relation to him was one of service, obedience, and dutiful respect. A lesser but similar expression was expected of a man toward his elder brothers and relatives of an older generation.

Females generally were subordinate to males as well as to elders. The wife was

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3. Ibid., pp. 13-16. Cf. Levy, op. cit., pp. 42-60.

4. The material presented in this and the following paragraphs on the traditional and changing family is based largely on the comprehensive works on the family by Levy, op. cit. and Lang, op. cit.

596 subject to the will of her husband and to that of her son when he became head of the house. While a man's parents lived, his wife was expected to be more subservient than he toward his parents. In her mother-in-law, the son's wife more often than not encountered a tyrant. The mother-in-law, rather than her son, governed and judged the actions of the son's wife.

B. Social Role

596 182 The principal social function of the family in China was the bearing, rearing, and training of children. Sons were more highly valued than daughters, because only the former remained with the family after marriage, contributing to its labor and income, and only sons could perpetuate the family and perform the yearly rites in honor of the father and the family ancestors after the father's death. Implicit in the ceremony was the idea that the ancestors had a life after death, watched over the family's fortune, and were comforted by the periodic ministrations of the family. For the living, the rites provided an occasion for awe and respect during which the continuity of the family over time was reemphasized and the solidarity and duties of the family unit in the present reasserted.

The veneration of ancestors was so important to Chinese society that the absence of sons to carry on the yearly observances was regarded as a major failing on the responsible male's part and a tremendous catastrophe for the family. Concubinage and adoption were

596 socially and legally sanctioned as means of
182 providing sons, if marriage produced only daughters or no children at all. Because of the necessity of providing against a high death rate, the premium on sons resulted in over-population, only partly offset by a high rate of female infanticide.

564 Just as sex, age, and generation determined
596 an individual's status within the family, so did these factors determine his behavior and position in the community and the world at large. An additional determinant of his standing was the status of his family in society.

596 Authority and dominance were the province
562 of males. Women might exercise overt leadership, and occasionally did so. More frequently, they were the power behind the throne. Such cases were exceptional, however. In modern times at least, supremacy was neither desired by women nor readily admitted to when possessed.

888 Age was honored relatively and absolutely Long life automatically gave its possessor higher standing in the community, but whatever age he attained, he was to show respect to his elders and members of an older generation. In the society of traditional China age implied the accumulation of wisdom and experience vital to society in times of decision or crisis.

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596 554 Individual status also improved with education, more particularly with the attainment of a degree in the official examinations and appointment to official position. An individual's educational or official career was usually dependent on the willingness and ability of the family to support him during a long period of study. A particularly promising youngster of a poor family might occasionally be underwritten by the clan or village. Whatever his means of fianancial support, his success in the exams was a reflection of proper upbringing and honored his family and, to a lesser extent, his clan and village almost as much as himself. The wealth usually accumulated by an official during his career also materially enhanced the village and clan as well as the family. For these reasons, reflected glory accrued to the kin of an illustrious scholar or official for generations after his death.

C. Political Role

577 829 To a remarkable extent, the Chinese imperial system operated by moral suasion with a minimum use of force and without a developed, codified system of law. This achievement was made possible through the state's utilization of the family as a training

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618 state's jurisdiction.[5]

In gathering together all the members of the tsu for the yearly rites honoring its ancestors, this social institution served to bring the poor and uncultured into contact with, and under the influence of, the well-to-do and educated gentry. Its more accomplished members headed the clan and represented the closest approximation to the ideal of the "superior man" (chün-tzu). Meetings with such men, whose behavior was patterned by leisure and education beyond the means of the great majority of society, provided the lower classes with living models for emulation and opportunities to impress the young with the proper attitude of respect toward their social superiors.

631 5K Another institution based on the family utilized by the state was the pao-chia system. As it was constituted under the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644 to 1912) and again in the 1930's by the National Government, ten adjacent families were grouped as a p'ai, ten p'ai as a chia, and ten chia, or one thousand households, as a pao. The head of each unit was responsible for the conduct and defense of those households under him, and the head of the pao had to answer to the government for the conduct

5. On the clan see Hu Hsien-chin, The Common Descent Group in China and Its Functions (Viking Fund Publications in Anthropology, No. 10), New York, The Viking Fund, Inc., 1948.

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596 and protection of the thousand households.

D. Economic Role

596 As the definition of the term "family" infers, it was the basic economic unit of the society. Real property such as land, houses, and workshops were owned by the family rather than by individuals. When disharmony caused the breakup of a joint family, its real property was divided among the constituent conjugal families, each as a new family claiming title to the portion of property which fell to its share.

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462 The peasant, artisan, and small-merchant families were units of both production and consumption. Male family members worked together in the fields, workshops, or stores to produce the goods on which the family mainly relied for a living. Sons nearly alway followed their father's occupation and seldom left home. Women worked in the home, taking care of the children and turning out the family's clothes and shoes. Where sericulture was practiced, women managed the entire industry from the cultivation of mulberry trees to the weaving of cloth. Food and clothing were allotted each member according to his needs, as they were determined by the head of the house and permitted by the family's circumstances.

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596 Some variation from this pattern occurred among the upper-class families. Gentry-officials and merchants were often away from home; they frequently had personal income from salaries or business, from which they met their expenses without resorting to the family treasury.

596 888 The family and its extensions in China also functioned to provide security in old age, food or material help to the poor, and employment for needy or deserving relatives when possible. That a son should not provide for his parents in their old age was unthinkable. Were the sons dead or in some other way unable to assist their parents, the aged were cared for by other close relatives or by the clan. Deeply sanctioned by kinship morality and firmly rooted in Chinese government and business, nepotism was one of the most resistant factors to the advance of the modern political, industrial, and business systems in the twentieth century.

III. THE CHANGING FAMILY

A. Influence of Modern Technology

596 178 The transition which occurred in the traditional Chinese family from approximately 1842 to the advent of the Communist regime is traceable to three major influences: (1) modern technology with its attendant factory system and modern business organization;

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(2) the new environment consisting of rapid transportaton, modern government education, rural education organizations, and modern books and periodicals; and (3) the revolutionary political and social ferment which followed in the wake of the Western penetration of China. Change came first and most penetratingly in the ports, which were initially influenced by Western trade and later by the growth of native industry centered on those cities. The same influences also reached into the rural environs of the city ports in the decades before World War II. The great mass of the Chinese people -- the population of the traditional villages, towns, and cities in the interior -- felt the modern impact only in minor ways, if at all.

The first influence of modern technology in China came in the form of an influx of manufactured goods. Their availability at cheap prices changed the consumption and production habits of the family. Articles formerly made at home were bought with cash, necessitating new types of spare-time or full-time occupation removed from the family sphere.

Much more important in effecting a change in the old family pattern was the introduction of modern factory and business methods into China. For one thing, it organized economic activity on a non-family basis. Persons from rural areas attracted to the city by the

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opportunity to earn an independent income or the necessary supplement to the family's farm income were forced to make their homes near their jobs for at least a part of the year. Either permanently or temporarily they were removed from direct family control and subjected to the new ideas associated with industrial society everywhere.

Another consequence of the factory and business system was a new criteria for employment. The efficient operation of modern production and management required that personnel be hired on the basis of the possession of such skills as a particular job demanded rather than on the old basis of personal or kin relationship to the owner or responsible management. The solidarity of blood relationship and the old employment function of kinship were prime resistants to the spread of modern business enterprise in China, but where the latter succeeded in establishing itself, it forced a fundamental break in the old Chinese familial process.

E. Influence of Modern Environment

In many places where the Chinese population was sheltered from direct contact with modern industrial life, an indirect influence was exerted by the environment. The modern curriculum taught in foreign missionary schools in the late nineteenth and

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•596 178 the twentieth centuries was approximated by the new government schools and offered to a broader segment of the population in the decade before World War II. New social, political, and economic ideas thus disseminated were supplemented by the outpourings of the press. Some rural villages formerly a day's journey or more away from the nearest great city were brought only hours away by modern methods of transportation, particularly the railroad and the steamship. All these media brought the people and especially the young into contact with ideas and ways of life alien to their own. Awareness of new opportunities, comforts, and pleasures to be had in the modern city planted a seed of dissatisfaction with the old manner of living.

C. Influence of Revolutionary Thought

An even more disturbing influence on the old way of life was the increasing spread of revolutionary social and political doctrines after 1916. The monarchical reformer K'ang Yu-wei had brought the traditional family under attack as early as 1898 by castigating the "virtues" associated with it as either non-existent or harmful to society. These ideas did not achieve any widespread currency in China until the rise of the New Culture Movement in 1916, a revolution in Chinese thought and expression. It emphasized individualism, the equality of the sexes, and the duty of service and loyalty to the nation. Ideas of this sort were spread by the May

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Fourth Movement of 1919, in the revolutionary propaganda of the Kuomintang during its struggle for power in the mid-twenties, by the student anti-Japanese agitation of the thirties, and in the socially conscious writings of China's new and popular authors.

D. Effects on Family Nature and Structure

In the relatively small area where these influences were felt, traditional family organization and the roles and functions dependent on it were forced to give way. With a part of the family temporarily or permanently in the city, the authority of the traditional family head was undermined. He was still needed at home to carry on the farm work, and so it was generally the daughters, the sons not needed for agriculture, and occasionally, the wives who entered the cities to seek part-time or full-time work. They sent home from the cities whatever part of their wages that could be spared from their own living needs. The family head thus controlled only their excess earnings and not their full income. He no longer directed the production of the family as a unit nor determined wholly every member's share in consumption. For at least part of the year, he could exert no direct control over the city-dwelling members of the family. With the possibility of an independent livelihood in the city, adult family members in nearby villages had an alternative to harsh treatment by the family head. This factor

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596 tended to have a moderating influence on
178 paternalistic authoritarianism.

596 The family in the rural areas adjacent to
562 industrialized cities was also affected in other ways. Men of advanced years, particularly if they had a classical education or held official position, continued to be honored. However, their position of influence and authority was challenged by younger men with the personnal qualities of dynamic leadership and success. Ancestor worship continued to give a greater primacy to males in the family but the ability of daughters to earn a wage enhanced their value to the family and made their early marriage into another family less desirable. It should be noted, however, that women of farming and laboring families worked outside of the home only out of sheer economic necessity. Neither sex approved of female employment in the factory. Whenever possible, it was avoided or terminated. Among upper-class families, women with modern education began gradually to seek employment in the professions and to regard such work as a means of establishing permanent personal and economic independence.

594 The independent family in the modern city was most subject to change. Though

"aginst the trend of the time"; as "immoral," "corrupt," "lazy," "egotistic," "too cautious"; and for gambling, smoking opium, and frequenting brothels. Mothers were more gently and less often criticized, but were reproached for "political backwardness," "unhygienic habits," "gossiping, playing mah-jong, quarrelling [and] ill treatment of young daughters-in-law." College students also reported more actual disagreements with parents than did high school students. The most frequent subjects of disagreement were marriage, politics, education, participation in the students' movement, recreation, modern hygiene, and fashions, friends, and future professions.[6]

E. Effect on Family Economic Role

The decreasing ability of the family to function as a production and consumption unit or as an employment agency in an industrial society has already been pointed out. The initial break with the old form of employment was forced by foreign firms or government services headed by foreigners. Their prohibition against officers hiring or recommending relatives was only beginning to be copied by wholly Chinese institutions such as banks, factories, and schools in the years before World War II. Where the employment of relatives was forbidden, friendship, a common birthplace, training in the same school, or membership in the same secret society often provided the basis for a personal link between an employer and a prospective

6. Lang, op. cit., pp. 284-87. [p.176]

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596 employee and for the rise of cliques in business
572 and government offices.
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Scattered surveys of various strata of the population in industrial areas indicate that only at the upper managerial or owner level, where the facts of economic operation were most pressing, was the majority in favor of impersonal, rational selection of employees. Even in modern colleges, only about half the students appeared to favor that choice. With each successively lower economic level, the preference was more overwhelmingly for selection on the basis of kinship.[7]

F. Effect on Social and Political Role

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867 With the collapse of the imperial system in 1912, the family was no longer fitted to serve as the social and political training ground of China. The political parties and modern schools, particularly the colleges and universities, now began to train youth for the new political world which was coming into being after 1911. No comparable institutions existed to inculcate in youth a moral and ethical code that would serve as a common guide in the new society. Attempts by the Kuomintang leaders during the period of the National Government to restore filial piety along with a revised Confucian code to the service of an increasingly authoritarian-minded state met

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with failure among the nation's youth.[8]

IV. THE FAMILY UNDER COMMUNISM

A. The Marriage Law

In reconstructing Chinese society, the Communist regime has undertaken to change the nature and function of the family. The first step in this direction was the new Marriage Law promulgated in May 1950. It is one of the three legal pillars of the state. The other two -- the Labor Union Law and the Land Reform Law -- were announced at a later date but put into effect within a much shorter time and with greater immediate success.[9]

Essentially, the outward provisions of Marriage Law are comparable to the laws affecting marriage and the family in the civil and penal code announced by the National Government in 1930 and 1931.[10] The basic features of the new law are summed up in its first three articles, which provide for:

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8. Mary C. Wright, "From Revolution to Restoration: The Transformation of Kuomintang Ideology, "Far Eastern Quarterly, August 1955, pp. 515-32.

9. See comment by the American editors of Current Background, Hong Kong, American Consulate, 236, pp. 1-3; hereafter cited as C.B.: Unless editorial comment is indicated, as here, citations from Current Background refer to literal translations of material in Communist

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Reports on the results of the 1952 investigations of Marriage Law implementation were framed in equally incomparable area and time categories. One report covering northern Kiangsu during the first half of 1952 noted that the number of arranged engagements during the period totaled 39,911 or nearly three times the number of engagements "founded on free love," while 19,894 arranged marriages had taken place, exceeding the number of free marriages by 28 per cent.[28] Another report at about the same time gave a more complete picture for the whole province of Kiangsi from May 1950 to January 1952. In the province during that time, it was reported 121,000 free marriages had been arranged with the assistance of the All-China Federation of Democratic Women, more than 72,900 divorces had been instituted after the failure of reconciliation attempts, the marriages of 16,454 child brides had been annuled, 40,902 engagements arranged by parents had been terminated, and 33,634 couples had been aided in establishing harmonious homes by the intercession of the People's Government.[29]

D. Reorientation of Family Reform

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Between the time of the publication of these

28. C.B., 236, p. 14.
29. Ibid., p. 4.

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divorce figures in March 1952 and the end of the year, the Communist approach to marriage and family reform seems to have undergone a change. There are indications that the regime's emphasis on new freedom for women and the prominent publicity given statistics on divorce had led to the Marriage Law being popularly termed the "Divorce Law."[30] At the same time, resistance in the rural areas to sudden changes in the old institutions of marriage and family relations were becoming evident to Party leaders as the result of the late 1952 investigations were tabulated.

A shift in the pace and in the propaganda emphasis on marriage and family reform was evident in Liu Ching-fan's report to the Government Administrative Council at the end of 1953. Although the better treatment and greater freedom given to woman was not to be neglected, greater emphasis was placed on the establishment of "harmonious" and "democratic" relationships within the family, whether originally of the old or new type, and to the positive benefits that would accrue to all members of the family as a consequence of reform.[31]

Analyzing the then current situation, Liu noted that the people still maintained a feudal ideology and consciousness in regard to many

30. China News Analysis, 5, p. 2.
31. C.B., 273, pp. 5-6.

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social problems, and that this attitude in respect to marriage problems was a "more universal and serious one." Liu admitted that the abolition of the feudal marriage system and the establishment of the new system was "a long term and difficult process in the ideological and social reform of the people." To accomplish this reform, he added, the regime would have to co-ordinate its efforts with the people's personal interests and levels of attainment, persuade the people patiently, and raise their level steadily. The process of implementing the Marriage Law, Liu concluded, would have to be made part of the regular tasks of the government and people's organizations at all levels and co-ordinated with the central tasks of production, construction, and elections.[32] These recommendations have become the principles by which the government still seems to be guided in marriage and family reform.

In the cities where modern influences had prepared the people for acceptance of new marriage and family principles, the regime encountered a different kind of problem. Just before International Women's Day, March 8, 1955, an authoritative statement in the Communist press added a new note to the usual references to lingering remnants of feudal obstruction and the

32. Ibid., pp. 4-6.

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long-term nature of family reform. The statement charged that bourgeois ideology had reached into marriage and family relationships. The bourgeois influences detected were love of luxury and disparagement of labor, "carelessness" in choosing marriage partners or the desire for new partners after marriage, and devotion to self-interest. They had respectively given rise to the sins of marriage based on money, "the belittlement of sexual relationships," and maltreatment, desertion, and irresponsibility toward parents and children.[33]

The nation's young people were evidently the most prone to this subversive influence. A campaign was launched in the large cities during the spring of 1955 to guard youth against "bourgeois concepts." In connection with the drive, the Communist press evidenced concern regarding romantic love, heart-break, unsolved marriage problems of workers in sparsely populated areas, and the attractions and diversions of a carefree social life in the cities. These things, the press warned, were subverting many young people from their primary duty of devoting their whole effort and attention to study and work in the national interest. The advice of the Communist editors "to place love in a secondary

33. Ibid., 1006, pp. 15-18; 1052, pp. 25-33.

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position in one's live" is hardly likely to solve the problem.[34]

A different sort of problem confronted youth in the countryside. Apparently the possibility was not present there for youth to develop love and marriage attachments through the ideal and officially sanctioned method of mutual participation in production, indoctrination, and study. A 1955 report on Marriage Law implementation admitted that "in the extensive rural districts... the conditions for adequate communal life and avenues for social intercourse" are lacking. As a result, "most marriages are still being contracted after both parties were first introduced to each other by third parties." The report hastened to explain that as the bride and groom gave their previous agreement to the marriage it was to be regarded as a marriage of free will and not to be confused with the old and outlawed practice of arranged marriage.[35]

E. Replacement of the Family's Social, Economic, and Political Role

A second step taken by the Communist regime to change radically the nature and function of the Chinese family was accomplished with the establishment of organizations to regiment

34. Ibid., 1006, pp. 15-18; 1052, pp. 25-33.
35. Ibid., 1002, p. 3.

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every phase of human endeavor. The labor unions in the city, the peasant associations, mutual-aid teams, and co-operatives in the country became the center not only of economic life, but of social, political, and indoctrination activities as well. Unions were organized in the cities almost as soon as they fell to the Communist armies, but the formation of comparable institutions in the countryside awaited the gradual process of land reform. Until it was completed in any area, no alternate organization to the family existed to assume its socio-economic role. This fact seems to explain why the Communists during the spring of 1953 limited their Marriage Law campaign in the countryside to those areas where land reform had been accomplished.

Special organizations were set up to train and absorb the energies of women and children who might otherwise be free of the constant direct influence of the government. These two groups were absorbed respectively into the All-China Federation of Democratic Women and into the Young Pioneers, the Federation of Democratic Youth, and the New Democratic Youth Corps.

Aside from its primary role as a unit for procreation and for child-care until the young reached an age when they would prove adaptable to molding by the state, the family was left only with the secondary duty of supporting the state

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596 training process. An editorial in the People's
185 Daily in mid-1955 pointed out the "deep solicitude" of the goverment toward children, made manifest by the establishment of nurseries and schools and the teaching of proper attitudes toward children and the correct methods for educating them. "The new Socialist generation" was to be brought up "physically strong, courageous, honest, fond of study, patriotic, and imbued with collective spirit." The editorial also stated that trade unions were to help office employees and workers to learn how to educate their children: Teachers and directors of the Young Pioneers were to assume the "important responsibility" of guiding children in classrooms, meetings, and extra-curricular activities.[36]

593 With the Communist regime's emphases on
577 youth, loyalty to the state, socialist construction, and the rooting out of feudalistic and bourgeois ideas, the problem of the proper attitude of youth toward parents need clarification. An article on the subject in the January 1955 issue of China Youth emphasizes that "respect for one's parents is part of...individual or social Communist morals," but the attitude "must be governed by the interests of the Revolution." If the parents are counterrevolutionaries, they should not be respected but treated as enemies;

36. Ibid., 1064, pp. 11-13.

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593 577 if they are counterrevolutionaries who have been pardoned by the people and are still able to work, they should be made to "reform" through labor, and should not be pitied or helped. Only if they are unable to support themselves should they be aided by the children, "for if the children do not support them, then the burdenwill fall on the state, which is obviously undesirable." As to bourgeois parents, they should normally be shown respect and concern; but if they break the law, "the children should justly and dispassionately examine their crime." Working class parents "should of course be respected, loved, and taken care of." They should not be discriminated against or ridiculed because of the shortcomings they have inherited from the old regime, but "should be patiently persuaded to see the light."[37]

V. EAST CHINA REGION

A. Disparity of Family Life

•596 178 The widest diversity in the nature and function of the family is to be found in the East China Region. Kiangsu was the most industrialized province in China proper (excluding Manchuria) before World War II, and the trends forced by

37. Ibid., 973, pp. 30-32.

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accomodation to modern methods of factory production and city living paralleled the objectives sought in the Marriage Law or, at least, prepared the people for a change in the old institution. On the other hand, areas could be found throughout the East China Region where family life had been as little influenced by industrialization and modernization as could be found elsewhere in China. Fukien, for instance, was one of the last strongholds of the clan organization, which had ceased to exist as a functional entity elsewhere in the region. Fukien was also unique in another respect: the coastal areas of the province contained overseas communities wherein the family showed some significant departures from the typical Chinese family.

Communist press announcements of marriage conditions revealed by the investigations of late 1952 singled out isolated areas in the East China Region as typical of unaltered adherence to backward practices of the traditional family system throughout the country. Such examples were cited as P'ing-ho hsien, Fukien, where seventy per cent of all the women had been child brides;[38] a hsiang of T'ai-hsing hsien, Kiangsu, where the majority of children under ten years old had been betrothed by their parents;[39]

38. C.B., 236, p. 5.
39. Ibid., p. 14.

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167 The Communists calculate that family dependents in Fukien of overseas migrants number two million.[51]

595 516 Before the Japanese invasion of China, the family in these overseas communities was similar in solidarity, values, and social role to the family elsewhere in China, but unique in that often the male head was separated from his wife and their children for most of his adult life. If he could afford it, he would maintain a concubine and a separate family in the overseas community Although it was usual for the children of this overseas union to be sent to China for their education and to share in inheritance of family property, the concubine rarely came with her Chinese mate when he returned to his native village.[52]

434 596 During the absence of the male head from his Chinese home, his wife usually acted as head of the household. She and her children were supported in great part by funds periodically remitted from abroad by the male head, and she had control of the dispersion of this and other

51. S.C.M.P., 1024, p. 13.

52. Ta Chen, Emigrant Communities in South China: A Study of Overseas Migration and Its Influence on Standards of Living and Social Change, ed. by Bruno Lasker, N. Y., Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940, pp. 140-43.

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family income derived from labor or property in the home village. The usual source of income at home was from agriculture.[53]

Although the economic status of emigrant families ranged from poor to wealthy, the overseas communities were on the whole wealthier than non-emigrant neighboring villages. The excess of the wealthier families' dual income was largely invested in land and houses.[54] When the Communist took over the area, they were faced with the problem of what attitude ought to be taken toward these landlord families whose income from abroad was a vital source of foreign exchange for the government.

Evidently, no special privilege or status was initially allowed members of these families, and their real property was expropriated on the same basis as that of any other element considered to be exploitive by the regime. On the other hand, the government exerted every effort to influence members of overseas families to write letters to their relatives abroad, setting forth the benefits of land reform and Communist reconstruction in order to woo overseas sympathy and investments in every way possible.[55]

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53. Ibid., pp. 58-85, 106-23.
54. Ibid., p. 110.
55. C.B., 211, p. 40.

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457 668 The Communists did gain a favorable response from a part of the overseas element, but it was apparently not up to Communist needs and expectations, for various experiments and temporary shifts have marked the regime's subsequent policy toward the overseas Chinese and their dependents in China. New efforts to attract their sympathy were initiated in early 1955. Much publicity was given to the reclassification of overseas landlords as "no longer enemies of the state" before the expiration of the five-year probationary period. Buildings expropriated from overseas Chinese for government use were reportedly being returned to their former owners or paid for. The press reiterated the theme that measures were being taken to assure the right to ownership of overseas remittances and their delivery into the proper hands.[56]

D. The Pace of Reform

185 596 In the pace of family reform, the East China Region is probably not as far behind the North and Northeast regions as in other changes instututed by the Communist regime. Although the North and Northeast regions have been longer under Communist control, industrialization and modern city life with their influences for change in family form and function have a longer history in Shanghai than elsewhere in China. The rural

56. See section entitled "Overseas Chinese," in S.C.M.P. during the first six months of 1955; for instance, 1024, pp. 13-15.

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areas in the region uninfluenced by modern trends are at least no more widespread or prevalent than elsewhere in China.

If and as the new regime fulfills its plans for industrialization and the organization of rural areas in co-operatives or collectives, more insistent pressures than mere propaganda will be brought to bear on the traditional family. But even this kind of force will not completely wipe out the old attitudes and loyalties of the elder generation. No such drawbacks characterize the heavily indoctrinated youth of today, more enthusiastic than their parents for the new order, but the urge manifested by many emancipated young people toward individualism and romanticism in love and marriage may pose a problem of equal calibre for the new masters of China

577 ideas; some have been discarded, others have been taken over with little adaptation; still others linger between the lines and in the implications of Communist utterances.

596 577 The old virtues associated with the traditional family have been discarded because the old family system has been dissolved, its functions taken over by the modern conjugal family on the one hand and by state and Party organizations on the other.[35] Familial virtues are castigated as "feudal" and as backward features of what the leadership calls "the squalid old society of China."[36]

829 The basic Marxist dogma that the individual is molded by his class position and, indirectly, by the "stage of the society into which he is born, has a good deal in common with the Confucian view of the prime importance of environment in the formation of character. Thus the Communist effort to create a new society, in both traditional Chinese and Marxist terms, will create favorable environment for the development of individual goodness. But the "goodness" expected is different: "To sacrifice the individual for the sake of the Party, for the sake of the class, for national liberation, or the liberation of mankind, even to sacrifice one's own life without the slightest hesitation, with a feeling of happiness -- this is the highest expression of Communist morality...."[37]

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35. J. M. H. Lindbeck, "Communist Policy and the Chinese Family," Far Eastern Survey, #20, (July 25, 1951), pp. 137-41.

36. Liu Shao ch'i, quoted in Nivison, Communist Ethics and Chinese Tradition, Stanford

[cont'd next page]

593 In exchange for his submission to authority
156 and discipline in every phase of his personal life, the individual was given the basic necessities of life and the help of the family's influence in obtaining jobs, and in obtaining a bridge, etc. Nepotism was sanctioned by the classics, and family members benefited when one of them rose to wealth or power.

572 The only social relationship which an individual could enjoy with less family interference was friendship, which was the most cherished thing in life. Many a Chinese poet has dealt with this theme. Popular novels and dramas have treated it with vividness and force. Friendship has the overtones of the elder-brother, younger-brother relationship. As John Weakland has observed, this type of relationship between individuals, self-elected, with virtual equality between the participants, is a refuge from the father-dominated, rigid hierarchy of the family.[51]

829 The two patterns -- paternal domination and fraternal association -- are reflected in political life. Established governmental authority is of the paternal type; everyone is subject to the will of the emperor-father. But dissident movements are organized on the basis of the brotherly friendship pattern; the romantic rebels of Chinese novels, the organization of bandit gangs, the leadership of rebel armies are all bound together by ties of friendship and blood brotherhood.

178 When the old social order began to break
596 up under the impact of modern forces, the family

51. Ibid., pp. 137-47

178 system was undermined and began slowly to dis-
integrate. Chinese critics held that the old family
596 stifled individuality, prevented the development of
individual initiative vital to modern China, and
that it was a breeding ground for authoritarianism
hindering the development of democratic citizen-
ship. They also felt that a new kind of individual
was needed, and that the family system prevented
its birth.[52]

156 The Communists are developing a new imag
of the individual and a new relationship between th
individual and authority; doing this they are using
certain of the old family ideas and, capitalizing
on dissatisfaction with the old family system, they
are releasing the individual from his bonds and
pushing him into a new system of human relations.

The Communists have paid particular atten
tion to the groups which suffered most under the
old family: women, particularly younger women,
such as daughters-in-law, and adolescents. Bitter
denunciations of the tyranny of the old family syste
by dramatizing its inequities, insistence on the
individual's loyalty to the Party rather than to
the family -- all these are being resorted to in
order to create new individuals suited to the needs
of a Communist society. In Communist literature
this new type of individual, free of the family and
its "feudal" relationships, is presented as having
boundless opportunities for self-development.
Stories of young "heroes" who have broken away --

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52. Cf. Theodore Chen, "New China, New Texts," Current History, No. 19, 1950, p. 325.

829 "a good daughter of the Party." [57] A song says:

Our great fatherland --
We should pay it the same filial
reverence,
As we would show to our mothers.[58]

596 These quotations suggest the reorientation of loyalties away from the family, but note that the terms and images used are those of the family system itself -- a typical example of the Communist use of the old order to destroy the old order. The functions of the traditional extended family are divided among the Party, the state, and the new type conjugal family. The individual, not the family, now chooses his mate -- often with "advice from Party comrades," and the state, not the family, sanctions the match.[59] The child is taught to rely on himself rather than on his relatives, and state nurseries take over, for many parents, the function of child care.[60] In illness

57. Cf. Jen-min Hua-pao [People's Pictorial], Vol. 2, No. 2, 1951.

58. In Ch'ang-chiang Ko-sheng [Yangtze Songs], No. 7, Hsin-hua ch'u-pan she, Wuhan Branch, Wuhan, 1950, p. 15.

59. Cf. Lindbeck, op.cit., pp. 140-41.

60. The peom "Wen Pao-pao ["Ask Baby"] appeared in lower primary grade textbook in 1950. It has baby asking for various members of the family to carry him. But each member is busy at a separate task: hoeing grain, tending a machine, writing speeches, etc., and baby ends by saying, "Everybody has something to do. I'd rather walk alone by holding onto a wall." Translated in Weakland-Bunzel, Appendix B.

596 one looks to state and Party health agencies, but responsibility for the care of the aged devolves upon the children of the conjugal family.[61] The family's function as an administrative unit for mutual surveillance and responsibility is now eliminated, and each citizen is responsible to the state. Family connections are no longer a means of getting jobs; they are assigned to individuals by state and Party organizations. In this way the Communists undermine what is left of the old family and strike at the age-old evil of nepotism.

156 Yet, with the shattering of the old family and the assumption of its functions by the state, the individual is still urged by the leadership to work in a disciplined and co-operative way for the larger social group. The following prescription for individual behavior recalls the formulas for the activity of good members of the traditional family.

> Citizen of the People's Republic are expected to engage in labor and productive activities and to place the common good above personal benefit. They must learn to be helpful and co-operative. They must work hard and submit willingly to the discipline of group life. They must always be ready to learn to accept criticism for the purpose of improvement.[62]

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61. Cf. Survey of China Mainland Press, No. 973, Jan. 21, 1955, pp. 31-32; "...when parents are counterrevolutionaries, the child should treat them as enemies."

62. Cf. Theodore Chen, op.cit., p. 324, and Weakland-Bunzel, pp. 153-54.